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Abstract
The feedback negativity (FN) is a component of the event-related brain potential (ERP)
that is associated with stimuli indicating unfavorable outcomes like losses in monetary
gambling  tasks  or  negative  performance  feedback.  A recently  proposed  theory  of
reinforcement  learning holds  that  the FN is  generated whenever ongoing events  are
evaluated as 'worse than expected'. The work at hand investigated the role of the FN in
the context of  the Ultimatum Game (UG).  In  this game,  two players  split  a  certain
amount of money (10 Euros in the present research); one player (commonly entitled the
proposer) suggests a division and the other (called the responder) can either accept or
reject it. We were interested in the question whether the perception of (un)fairness, as
experienced by responders  being confronted  with different types  of UG offers,  was
reflected in the amplitude of the FN. Additionally, we tried to assess the impact of social
distance (manipulated via information provided to the responders about their presumed
counterparts) on behavioral and neural responses of our subjects.
We recorded electroencephalograms (EEGs) while participants were in the role of the
responder, facing fair (a proposed split of 5-5), midfair (7-3) or unfair (9-1) offers. We
sought  to  generate  (or  additionally  enforce)  expectations  in  our  UG  subjects  by
providing  information  about  their  presumed  counterparts  in  half  of  the  trials.  This
manipulation  was  accomplished  to  reduce  the  degree  of  social  distance  among  the
players, which has been shown to have strong influence on economic game behavior.
We found that the perception of different types of UG offers generated an FN, being less
pronounced for fair as compared to midfair and unfair offers. Social distance crucially
influenced brain responses to the three offers, as differences in the FN amplitude were
only apparent when social information about the responders' counterparts was revealed.
We propose that the FN in the context of this study reflects the violation of general
expectations and fairness considerations of our subjects which are activated by social
information. It is further suggested that the amplitude of the FN depends on the size of
the prediction error, growing with the magnitude of deviation from the fair 50-50 split.
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Theoretical Part
9
1 Economic decision-making
The question of how people make decisions and judgements has occupied scientists for
centuries.  Based  on  different  models  and  assumptions  diverse  efforts  have  been
undertaken to analyze and explain human decision-making behavior. Classic economic
theory has developed the well known concept of the homo oeconomicus, a rational, self-
interest-guided and unemotional maximizer (Kenning and Plassmann, 2005).
The  influence  of  emotions  and other  psychological  factors  on  (economic)  decision-
making has  traditionally been underestimated or  even ignored and it  is  the field  of
behavioral economics which emerged in the 1970s that started to challenge the idea of
the decision-maker as "a perfectly rational cognitive machine" (Sanfey et al., 2003).
Extensive experimental  research in behavioral  economics (see for example Camerer,
Loewenstein  and  Rabin,  2003 for  an  overview)  has  made  clear  that  it  is  not  only
personal material payoff that motivates people in their actions – as proposed by standard
economic theory – but that other constructs like fairness or reciprocity play a decisive
role  when  people  make  decisions.  Deviations  from  the  predictions  of  traditional
concepts  like subjects  showing non-opportunistic  behavior  or  other  "anomalies"  and
"paradoxes" (Camerer and Thaler, 1995) led to the integration of psychological ideas
and concepts into economic theory, creating broader models of economic behavior.
One main point of criticism coming from traditional economics addressed the fact that
theoretical  constructs  like  "intuition"  and  "reasoning"  (Kahneman,  2002;  cited  after
Kenning and Plassmann,  2005) have been postulated based on the "observation and
analysis  of  behavior,  which  in  turn  is  used  to  explain  behavior"  (Kenning  and
Plassmann,  2005).  Economists  did  not  only  resent  this  circular  reasoning but  also
complained about the mentioned theoretical constructs neither being directly observable
nor measurable in an objective way.
An interdisciplinary framework which has evolved in recent years seems to have the
potential  to  integrate  economic  theories  and  direct  measurement  of  thoughts  and
feelings:  Neuroeconomics.  This  discipline  seeks  to  analyze  economically  relevant
behavior using neuroscientific techniques like brain imaging and has the "ultimate aim
of providing a single,  general theory of human behavior" (Glimcher and Rustichini,
2004).
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The  following  chapters  try  to  shortly  overview  some  findings  from  behavioral
economics, game theory (especially one of its most prominent paradigms, the so-called
Ultimatum Game) and neuroeconomics to create a theoretical embedment for the work
at hand.
1.1. Behavioral economics
Experimental studies have highlighted shortcomings of classic economic theory, like for
example its assumptions about stable, well-defined preferences and rational choices of
decision-makers.  The  field  of  behavioral  economics  is  mainly  concerned  with  the
bounds of rationality, self-interest and self-control of economic agents and points out
that concepts like fairness and reciprocity cannot be ignored in social interactions (Fehr
and Schmidt, 2006).
It  was  in  the  1960ies  that  cognitive  psychology  put  the  brain  as  an  information
processing unit into the focus of interest – in contrast to behaviorist models defining it
as  a  black  box  whose  functioning  would  not  be  known.  Consequently,  cognitive
psychologists  like  Daniel  Kahneman  or  Amos  Tversky started  analyzing  economic
decision  making  and  expressing  psychological  principles  and  constructs  in  simple
formal  terms.  Thus,  bounded  rationality  could  be  modeled  in  terms  familiar  to
economists  and  economic  theory  was  linked  more  and  more  to  psychological
foundations (Camerer, 1999).
''Prospect theory'', as presented by Kahneman and Tversky (1992), tries to explore how
people make choices when confronted with alternatives involving risk. According to the
authors, the evaluation of potential gains and losses implies weighting their probabilities
nonlinearly:  People integrate their  experience and thus utilities  are determined from
some reference point. Prospect theory has shown that people are "loss-averse", which
means that  losses are disliked about twice as much as equally-sized gains are liked.
Furthermore, people overestimate low probabilities, which may be of help in explaining
the widespread desire to gamble for example on lottery tickets (see Camerer, 1999).
Economic models generally assume that people are pursuing their material self-interest
and do not worry about "social" goals per se (Fehr and Schmidt, 1999). That people do
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not only behave rationally but care about others in social exchange is demonstrated in
laboratory experiments  operating with game theoretic paradigms like the  Ultimatum
Game. Some of these findings are reported in the next part of this work.
1.2. Game theory
As  a  sub-discipline  of  applied  mathematics,  game  theory investigates  systems  with
various agents, trying to mathematically comprehend behavior in strategic situations, in
which an individual's success in making decisions or choices depends on those of other
"players".
A formalized  analysis  of  parlour  games  by the  Hungarian-American  mathematician
John von Neumann can be seen as the fundament of modern game theory. Together with
the Austrian economist  Oskar  Morgenstern he published  The Theory of  Games and
Economic Behavior  (von Neumann and Morgenstern,  1944),  "the birth  cry of  game
theory", as Karl Sigmund put it (Sigmund, 2004).
According  to  Camerer,  Loewenstein  and  Prelec  (2005),  there  are  four  central
assumptions on which game theoretic predictions are based: (1) players have accurate
beliefs about what others will do; (2) they have no emotions or concern about how
much others earn; (3) players plan ahead and (4) learn from experience.
The methodology of game theory mainly consists of modelling human interaction as a
game ("game" in this context means a mathematical model describing procedures, in
which several agents influence each other in the outcome of their decisions). Predictions
of  game  theory  are  quite  similar  to  those  of  classical  economics:  People  behave
rationally  and  are  anxious  for  maximizing  their  personal  benefit.  Addressing  von
Neumann's and Morgenstern's theory of rational behavior and its incompatibility with
experimental findings of actual human behavior, Sigmund stated that game theory is "a
mathematical tool more useful for description than for prediction" (Sigmund, 2004).
The Ultimatum Game is among the established and most studied tasks of game theory.
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1.2.1.    Ultimatum Game  
The so-called Ultimatum Game is a well known experiment which clearly demonstrates
that  the  self-interest  hypothesis  is  hard  to  argue  for  human  behavior  in  economic
decision-making. The Ultimatum paradigm (see Güth et al., 1982) is quite simple. Two
players are allocated a sum of money. The first player, commonly entitled the proposer,
offers some amount of the money to the second player, called the responder. If the offer
is accepted, the sum is divided accordingly. If the responder rejects it, neither of the
players is donated any money.
Assuming two rational players motivated purely by self-interest and not caring about
the  outcome of  the  other  (in  other  terms:  two income maximizers),  game theoretic
predictions are: The responder accepts any offer made and the proposer, aware of this,
will offer a minimum – the smallest nonzero amount – and keep the rest for himself. In
fact these predictions are at odds with observed behavior: The modal offer is a 50/50
split (average offers are about 40 to 50% of the total amount), and low offers of less
than one-fifth have a chance of about 50% to be rejected (Güth et al., 1982, Camerer
and Thaler, 1995; Roth, 1995). These patterns have been replicated in several studies
and can be considered as robust (Fehr and Schmidt, 1999). Interestingly the regularities
do not even change with rather high stake sizes, as for example Hoffman, McCabe and
Smith (1996a) pointed out, and can be found in different countries and cultural areas, as
Roth et al. (1991) demonstrated comparing bargaining behavior in the Ultimatum Game
in Jerusalem, Ljubljana, Pittsburgh and Tokio.
Obviously there are circumstances under which people are motivated to actively refuse
monetary reward. But why do people reject low offers? According to Fehr and Schmidt
(2006)  it  is  because  they  view  them  as  unfair.  Proposers  on  the  other  hand  act
generously because they anticipate their playfellows' rejection of low offers. Even in the
Dictator Game, a version of the Ultimatum Game where responders have to accept any
offer made by the proposer, people did allocate a portion of the total amount although
their payoff was not dependent on the placet of their partners (Forsythe et al., 1994).
Rabin (1993) provided a model of fairness based on findings from social psychology.
He integrated "intentions" and "attributions" of economic agents: People differentiate
between intentional acts of meanness, which they will punish, and an unintended mean
act, which will be tolerated. This reciprocal fairness view is complemented by the idea
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that responders in the Ultimatum Game primarily react to the "manners" of the proposer
(Camerer and Thaler, 1995). Camerer and Thaler (1995) presumed that the tendency to
reject  insulting  low  offers  is  learned,  as  manners  are.  The  authors  cited  a  study
(Murnighan and Saxon, working paper, 1994; published 1998) that seems to support this
view:  Playing  Ultimatum  Games  for  a  small  amount  of  money  or  candies,
kindergartners accepted minimal offers about 70% of the time, compared to about 40%
for third- and sixth-graders.
People turning down low offers are objecting to unfairness. They are willing to pass on
material  gain  in  order  to  punish  their  partners  for  their  unfair  behavior.  Negative
emotions induced by unfair condition in the Ultimatum Game are thought  to  be an
explanation  for  this  behavior.  Sanfey et  al.  (2003)  argued  that  unfair  offers  induce
conflict between cognitive and emotional motives in the responder, between tendencies
to  "accept"  and  "reject".  The  next  chapter  of  this  work  tries  to  explore  which
psychological and neural processes mediate such behavior in social exchange.
1.3. Neuroeconomics
The  field  of  Neuroeconomics  integrates  findings  and  principles  from  economics,
psychology and neuroscience in order to develop more accurate models of choice and
decision.  It  is  the  brain  and its  role  in  evaluating decisions,  categorizing risks  and
rewards and social interaction in general that is of main interest. While economists and
psychologists  provide  conceptual  tools  for  comprehending  and  modeling  behavior,
neurobiologists  offer  tools  for  the  study  of  mechanisms  (Glimcher  and  Rustichini,
2004).
Social decision-making has been investigated by various disciplines applying different
theoretical  frameworks  and  measurement  techniques,  but  with  comparatively  little
integration of results (Sanfey, 2007). It is important to state that explanations of choice
behavior by economists, psychologists and neurobiologists usually operate at different
levels of analysis. Neuroeconomics is considered to be a promising way to correct this
lack of integration (Glimcher and Rustichini, 2004; Sanfey, Loewenstein, McClure and
Cohen, 2006; Sanfey, 2007). By combining mathematical decision models and tasks that
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have been formulated by economics with cognitive and neural limitations as explored
by psychology and neuroscience, neuroeconomics tries to deepen the understanding of
decision-making (Sanfey, 2007).
Sanfey  et  al.  (2006)  expected  that  economics'  unified  theoretical  framework  for
understanding human behavior may prove most useful for neuroscientists – in particular
the  interpretation of  behavior  as  choosing alternatives  aiming at  maximizing utility.
According  to  the  authors,  economics  presumes  two dimensions  of  decision-making:
choice (the evaluation of options and selection of actions) and  judgment (information
processing  and  probability  estimation).  In  this  sense  making  decisions  could  be
understood  as  comparing  utility  signals  for  each  of  the  decision  alternatives.
Neuroeconomics  seeks  to  investigate  the underlying brain  mechanisms  – the neural
substrates  of  cognitive  and  emotional  processes  which  are  engaged  in  economic
decision-making.
If we conceptualize neuroeconomics as the application of neuroscientific methodology
to capture and decode economically relevant behavior (Camerer et al., 2005), we should
take a short look at applied neuroscientific methods.
1.3.1.    Neuroscience methods  
There  are  several  kinds of  neuroscientific  methods  that  are  capable  of  investigating
economic  decision-making.  Predominant  tools  currently  used  in  neuroeconomic
research  can  be  classified  into  two categories  (see  Kenning  and  Plassmann,  2005):
Procedures for measuring electromagnetic activity of the brain and techniques which are
sensitive to cerebral blood flow or metabolism changes.
Electroencephalography  (EEG) and  Magnetoencephalograhpy (MEG) are  prominent
examples of the first group: EEG records electric activity (voltage fluctuations) along
the scalp produced by ion fluxes in surface-near cortex areas whereas MEG is sensitive
to magnetic fields induced by the electrical brain activity. Both of these techniques are
able to detect time courses of different brain events precisely because of their temporal
resolution of milliseconds and below.
Brain  imaging  techniques  of  the  second  group  are  Positron  Emission  Tomography
(PET) and  functional  Magnetic  Resonance  Imaging  (fMRI).  PET  visualizes  the
distribution of a weakly radioactively marked substance (so-called tracer, like modified
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glucose (FDG)), which is injected or inhaled, in the organism. From this distribution,
information  about  metabolism or  brain  perfusion  can  be  deduced  and  visualized  in
tomograms. The currently most popular neuroscientific method is fMRI, which tracks
blood flow in the brain using changes in magnetic properties due to blood oxygenation
(the ”BOLD – Blood Oxygenation Level Dependent – signal”). The big advantage of
PET and fMRI is  their  high  spatial  resolution,  whereas  their  temporal  resolution is
comparatively low.
The  mentioned  techniques  are  complemented  by  various  others  like  Single-Neuron
Recording or Transcranial Magnetic Stimulation (TMS).
The long-run goal of neuroscientific research is to provide explanations for how the
brain solves different types of problems and especially how different parts of the brain
interact  in  doing  so.  Current  research  topics  in  neuroeconomics  are  diverse  and
scientists have addressed matters like preferences, utility and the reward system, as well
as  dynamic  concepts  like  learning or  strategic  reasoning (Kenning  and  Plassmann,
2005; Sanfey, 2007).
As the work at hand deals with the Ultimatum Game and the perception of (un)fairness,
some findings concerning the "social” brain will be presented in the following.
1.3.2.    Ultimatum bargaining and the brain  
Anger seems to be the reason why responders often reject unfair offers in the Ultimatum
Game (Pillutla and Murnighan, 1996). This finding supports the notion that emotions
play a crucial role in social decision-making. As Sanfey (2007) pointed out, emotional
processes appear to cover a network of brain structures including reward-processing
mechanisms as well as midbrain and cortex areas like the ventromedial prefrontal cortex
(VMPFC) and the anterior cingulate cortex (ACC). The prefrontal cortex (PFC) receives
inputs from most of the other regions, integrates them to form goals and plan actions
(Shallice  and  Burgess,  1996;  cited  after  Camerer  et  al.,  2005)  and  is  therefore
sometimes called the "executive” region. According to Bush, Luu and Posner (2000),
the ACC is involved in the evaluation of emotional and motivational stimuli and the
regulation of emotional answers.
Emotional states make people reject low offers in the Ultimatum Game or – in other
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words – provoke them to avoid inequity. Nowak, Page and Sigmund (2000) argued that
objecting to unfairness and punishing those who try to take advantage of others may
have  evolved  as  a  mechanism  to  maintain  a  social  reputation  and  to  strengthen
reciprocity.  Neuroscience  tries  to  explore  the neural  correlates  of  complex  affective
reactions  and  investigate  the  causal  relationship  between  emotional  reactions  and
ensuing decisions.  An fMRI-study by Sanfey,  Rilling,  Aronson,  Nystrom and Cohen
(2003)  shed  light  on  the  substrates  of  economic  decision-making  in  the  Ultimatum
Game: 19 participants were scanned, being in the role of the responder and confronted
with  fair  and  unfair  offers  by  human  and  computer  partners.  Sanfey  et  al.  (2003)
demonstrated that perceived unfairness correlated with activations in certain regions of
the brain: Comparing unfair with fair offers from human proposers, bilateral anterior
insula, the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC) and the ACC were among the areas
with greater activation.
The anterior insula is  often associated with negative emotional  states  such as  pain,
distress or disgust. Sanfey et al. (2003) interpreted the activity in this area as a reflection
of  the  responder's  negative  emotional  response  to  an  unfair  offer  and  showed  that
anterior insula activation predicted rather reliably (correlation of 0.45) whether players
reject unfair offers or not.
The DLPFC appears to be an area involved in planning ahead, goal maintenance and
executive control (Miller and Cohen, 2001; Wagner et al., 2001; cited after Sanfey et al.,
2003). Sanfey et al. (2003) argued that the activation of the DLPFC could be due to the
cognitive demand of the task, specifically the aim of accumulating as much money as
possible.
According  to  the  authors,  ACC activity can  be  linked  to  the  detection of  cognitive
conflict  (Botvinick et  al.,  1999) and may mirror  the conflict  between cognitive  and
emotional motivations in the Ultimatum Game.
Camerer,  Loewenstein  and  Prelec  (2005)  offered  a  catchy  interpretation  of  the
interaction of the mentioned brain areas sensitive to unfair offers:
"Therefore, it appears that, after an unfair offer, the brain (ACC) struggles to resolve
the conflict between wanting to accept the money because of its planned reward value
(DLPFC) and disliking the 'disgust' of being treated unfairly (insula).”
There is further evidence suggesting a central  role of the prefrontal  cortex (PFC) in
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social  decision-making. Koenigs and Tranel (2007) investigated Ultimatum decision-
making in patients with ventromedial PFC (VMPFC) damage and found a significantly
higher rejection rate of unfair offers for patients than a control group. Similar results
were obtained by Harle and Sanfey (2007) after having primed normal players with
negative emotional states.  Strong support  for a causal  relation between activation in
frontal  brain  regions  and  social  decisions  has  also  come  from  studies  employing
transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS): After a temporary lesion to the DLPFC has
been  induced,  responders  in  an  Ultimatum  Game  setting  were  ready  to  accept
significantly more unfair offers as compared with control situations (Van't Wout et al.,
2005; Knoch et al., 2006).
Polezzi  et  al.  (2008)  investigated  Ultimatum  bargaining  behavior  recording  event-
related potentials (ERPs) while subjects were in the role of the responder. The authors
reported that a fast initial distinction between fair und unfair offers was reflected in the
amplitude of the so-called feedback-related negativity (FRN), being larger for mid-value
(a proposed split of 7/3) than for fair (5/5) offers. The difference between fair and unfair
(9/1) offers approached significance (Polezzi et al., 2008).
The  following  section  compiles  findings  concerning  the  FRN  and  related  frontal
negativities.
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2 Frontal negativities and the anterior
cingulate cortex (ACC)
As reported in the preceding chapter, Sanfey et al. (2003) found the ACC as one of the
brain regions showing more activity when responders  in the Ultimatum Game were
confronted with unfair offers as compared to fair ones. ACC is ascribed an important
role in performance monitoring and error detection. Oliveira, McDonald and Goodman
(2007)  identified  three  different  views  of  how performance  monitoring  leads  to  an
increase in ACC activity: Miltner et al. (1997) argued that information signaling errors
in performance activates an error-detection system of which the ACC is part. Another
approach defined the ACC as one component of a conflict-monitoring system that is
activated by response competition rather than solely error detection (Botvinick, Cohen
and Carter, 2004; Yeung, Cohen and Botvinick, 2004; Botvinick, Braver, Barch, Carter,
and Cohen, 2001). A third view was presented by Holroyd and Coles (2002): Together
with other brain structures the ACC forms a reward-prediction system being activated
when ongoing events are evaluated as worse than expected.
Scientific research on the neural substrates and functioning of performance monitoring
and error detection has described a number of components of the event-related potential
(ERP) being elicited by errors and negative feedback regarding task performance. In a
review  article,  Folstein  and  Van  Petten  (2008)  divided  these  anterior  negative
components into the response-locked error-related negativity (ERN) and the feedback-
related negativity (FRN), which is time-locked to a feedback stimulus.
The  ERN  is  a  negative  deflection  peaking  around  50  to  100  milliseconds  after  a
response. As Falkenstein et al. (1990, 1991) as well as Gehring et al. (1993) showed, the
component is larger for errors than correct responses in choice reaction tasks. The ERN
is  recorded  at  fronto-central  scalp  areas,  being  maximal  in  amplitude  over  the
supplementary motor area (Holroyd and Coles, 2002).
The FRN is a negative brain potential which is localized in fronto-central scalp regions
and is peaking around 250 milliseconds after stimulus-onset. Miltner, Brown and Coles
(1997) reported an FRN following the presentation of negative performance feedback in
a time estimation task, the feedback indicating that the subject's time estimation was
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incorrect. The FRN seems to be sensitive to the quality of feedback only, regardless of
sensory modality of the feedback signal. As studies employing gambling tasks showed,
the FRN is also elicited as a response to monetary losses but interestingly does not
appear to be sensitive to the magnitude of the loss but rather to whether an outcome is
positive or negative (Yeung and Sanfey, 2004; Gehring and Willoughby, 2002 and 2004;
Hajcak, Moser, Holroyd and Simons, 2006).
Converging lines of evidence suggested that both components, the ERN as well as the
FRN, were generated in the medial  frontal  cortex,  even though the data were more
convincing  for  the  ERN  (Folstein  and  Van  Petten,  2008).  A  meta-analysis  by
Ridderinkhof,  Ullsperger,  Crone  and  Nieuwenhuis  (2004)  reviewed  functional
neuroimaging studies  on response  errors and negative feedback,  and found reported
activation in medial prefrontal cortex, namely Brodmann's areas 24 and 32 of the ACC
and  motor  areas  6  and  8  (see  Figure  1).  Source  localization  analyses  to  ERP-data
(Miltner et al., 1997; Gehring and Willoughby, 2002) have also identified the generator
of the FRN in or near the ACC.
It  is  not  only the assumed common generator  of  the ERN and FRN, but also their
similar fronto-central scalp distribution and morphology that led Miltner et al. (1997) to
the  proposal  that  the  two  components  were  associated  with  the  same  neural  and
cognitive process of error-detection. Holroyd and Coles (2002) suggested an influential
extension  of  Miltner  et  al.'s  (1997)  view  hypothesizing  that  the  medial  frontal
negativities  are  produced  by  a  dopamine  system  for  reinforcement  learning.  The
reinforcement learning theory ("RL-ERN theory”) holds that both the ERN and FRN are
generated by a dopaminergic signal  conveyed  to  the ACC to inform it  that  a  given
outcome  was  worse  than  expected.  Before  discussing  the  RL-ERN theory  in  more
detail, some other theoretical concepts concerning the ERN/FRN will be presented.
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2.1. ERN as a mismatch signal
Increasing interest in event-related brain potentials associated with the commission of
errors in choice reaction time tasks has been encouraged by the pioneering work of
Falkenstein and his colleagues (1990, 1991) and Gehring et al. (1993).
Apart from using different nomenclature for their error-related potentials (Falkenstein et
al.: Ne; Gehring et al.: ERN), both groups identified a negative component following
errors in choice reaction tasks and peaking up to 100 milliseconds after the onset of the
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Figure 1: Reported activations (midline foci) in 38 fMRI studies published between 1997 and 2004
investigating  brain  activity  associated  with  pre-response  conflict,  decision  uncertainty,  response
errors and negative feedback. The activation foci are superimposed on the enlarged schematic area
map. The majority of activations cluster in the posterodorsal medial frontal cortex, in the region
where Brodmann areas 8, 6, 32, and 24 border each other (adapted from Ridderinkhof et al., 2004).
response.  Further research of  the two mentioned groups led to the formulation of a
model of error-related processing, which was additionally supported by the work of
Coles, Scheffers and Holroyd (2001).
This model (Coles et al., 2001; see also Figure 2) incorporates the specific ERN or Ne
process and consists of two major components: a monitoring system detecting errors
and a remedial action system. The monitoring system compares representations of the
correct or appropriate response with those of the actual response. When a mismatch is
revealed in this comparison, an error signal is conveyed to the remedial action system.
This second error-processing component is responsible for initiating remedial actions,
construed to inhibit, correct or compensate the error. According to Coles, Scheffers and
Holroyd (2001), the ERN is generated by the arrival of the error signal at the remedial
action system.
As choice reaction time tasks call for rapid answers, it seems that committed errors are
due to guessing or other forms of impulsive responding. Thus responses are executed
before all the information needed to guide the correct response is extracted from the
stimulus.
Representations of the actual  response are probably derived from a central  feedback
system and when the motor command is issued to initiate the response, an 'efference
copy'  is  sent  to  the  monitoring  system.  Representations  of  the  correct  or  intended
response  on  the  other  hand  are  thought  to  follow from  ongoing  processing  of  the
stimulus after the incorrect response is produced.
Errors occur when responses are executed impulsively, i. e. before stimulus processing
is completed and a final representation of the correct response has been determined by
the response selection system. Coles et al. (2001) proposed that the mismatch process is
triggered by response execution itself and that the comparison system uses whatever
information is available at the time of the response instead of waiting until all possible
informations about the appropriate response are at hand.
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2.2. Conflict-monitoring theory of the ERN
The  conflict-monitoring  theory  of  ACC  function  (Botvinick  et  al.,  2001;  Yeung,
Botvinick and Cohen, 2004) contradicted the mismatch hypothesis and assumed that the
ERN was not signaling the occurrence of an error but rather reflected the continuous
evaluation of  response conflict.  Response conflict is  understood as  the  simultaneous
activation of incompatible response channels and considered to be monitored by the
ACC. In this sense, the ERN may not reflect the output of a system for error-detection
only, as the mismatch theory proposed, but is associated with the process of conflict
monitoring  that  also  occurs  on  correct  trials.  Yeung,  Botvinick  and  Cohen  (2004)
defined  the  ERN as  "the  input  to,  rather  than  the  output  from,  the  error  detection
system."
Holroyd and Yeung (2003) abstracted the conflict-monitoring theory of the ERN (see
also Figure 3) as follows: The ACC is accountable for monitoring response-conflict.
Whenever there is co-activation of competing responses (conflict), the ACC sends this
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Figure 2: Schematic representation of the mismatch theory of the ERN. See text
for explanations (Coles, Scheffers and Holroyd, 2001)
information to brain areas engaged in cognitive control, e. g. lateral prefrontal cortex.
Stimulus processing takes place in the posterior cortex and the resulting information is
mapped  to  a  corresponding  response  in  the  motor  cortex.  Sometimes,  an  incorrect
response is activated by noise in the system before the stimulus is fully processed, but
ongoing stimulus-related processing leads to the generation of the correct response (an
"error correction"). If both responses are simultaneously activated for a short period of
time after error commission, post-response conflict evolves. Whenever the ACC detects
such a conflict, it generates the ERN (Holroyd and Yeung, 2003).
The described theory explains the ERN in terms of a continuous evaluation of response
conflict whereas mismatch detection is considered to be a discrete process that occurs
only at the time of response execution (Coles et al., 2001). Because of their proposal
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Figure 3: Schematic representation of the conflict-monitoring theory of the
ERN. Abbreviations: ACC, anterior cingulate cortex; MC, motor cortex; PFC,
prefrontal cortex; PC, posterior cortex. See text for explanations (Holroyd and
Yeung, 2003)
that response conflict is monitored continuously, Yeung, Botvinick and Cohen (2004)
also accomplished to explain the relationship between the ERN and another component
of the event-related potential: the N2. The N2 is a negative potential peaking between
200 and 350 milliseconds after stimulus onset and with fronto-central scalp distribution.
Research traditions have focused on attention and novelty or perceptual mismatch as
determinants of N2 amplitude (for a review see Folstein and Van Petten, 2008). Yeung
et al. (2004) suggested that the N2 is produced by the ACC when it detects pre-response
conflict  on correct  trials.  The authors assumed a common underlying mechanism of
conflict monitoring for the N2 and the ERN.
2.3. Reinforcement learning theory of the ERN
Performance feedback elicits a negative ERP-component that is maximal over medial
frontal scalp locations. The amplitude of the FRN is larger following incorrect responses
or monetary losses, than following positive feedback (Miltner et al., 1997; Gehring and
Willoughby, 2002; Holroyd and Coles, 2002; Nieuwenhuis et al., 2004b). Because of
the deflection's  assumed generator,  the ACC, it  has  been suggested that  the FRN is
functionally similar to the error-related negativity (ERN) (Miltner et al., 1997).
Emphasizing  the  reward-signaling  function  of  feedback,  Holroyd  and  Coles  (2002)
formulated the so-called  reinforcement learning theory of the ERN (RL-ERN theory)
holding that a dopamine system for reinforcement learning generates both the response
ERN and  the  FRN (or  feedback  ERN).  The  authors  located  a  response-monitoring
system in the basal ganglia which produces error signals that activate the mesencephalic
dopamine system. The ERN is evoked by the impact of phasic changes in dopamine
activity  on  the  anterior  cingulate  cortex  (ACC)  (see  Holroyd  and  Yeung,  2003).
According to Nieuwenhuis, Holroyd, Mol and Coles (2004a), who referred to previous
research (e.g.  Schultz,  2002),  the basal  ganglia are responsible for  the evaluation of
ongoing events and the prediction of their outcome (success or failure; good or bad)
based on information received from the external environment and an efference copy of
the  response  (see  also  Figure  4,  Holroyd  et  Yeung,  2003).  If  these  predictions  are
revised (e.g., by an external stimulus), phasic increases or decreases in the activity of
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midbrain  dopaminergic  neurons  are  induced,  depending  on  whether  events  are
categorised as "better" or "worse than expected". These error signals, coded as changes
of the tonic activity of the mesencephalic dopamine system, are conveyed to the ACC
where they reinforce performance on the task at hand and in this way serve the adaptive
modification of behavior.  Furthermore,  the dopamine signals are carried back to the
basal  ganglia,  where they are used to improve predictions  (see Holroyd and Yeung,
2003 and Nieuwenhuis et al., 2004a).
The RL-ERN theory assumes that  the impact  of  the  dopamine signals  on the ACC
modulates  the  ERN  amplitude:  If  ongoing  events  are  assessed  to  be  worse  than
expected,  phasic  decreases  in  dopamine  activity  occur.  These  error  signals  are
associated with large ERNs. Phasic increases on the other hand, indicating that events
are better than expected, are accompanied by small ERNs (Holroyd and Coles, 2002).
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Figure 4: Schematic representation of the reinforcement learning theory of
the ERN. Abbreviations: ACC, anterior cingulate cortex; BG, basal
ganglia; DA, mesencephalic dopamine system. See text for explanations
(Holroyd and Yeung, 2003)
Based on the work of Holroyd and Coles (2002), Nieuwenhuis et al. (2004a) reviewed
findings about the feedback ERN resulting in the formulation of four predictions of the
reinforcement learning theory. The following are central for the study at hand:
 The  feedback  ERN  reflects  a  good-bad  evaluation:  The  RL-ERN  theory
proposed that  the ERN was sensitive to  any feedback information indicating
favorable  or  unfavorable  outcomes.  Taking  the  results  of  several  studies
(Nieuwenhuis et al., 2004b; Gehring and Willoughby, 2002; Yeung and Sanfey,
2004) into account, it seems that the ERN reflects a rapid evaluation of events
along an abstract good-bad dimension. Addressing the debate regarding whether
or  not  the  response  ERN and the feedback  ERN are the same phenomenon,
Nieuwenhuis  et  al.  (2004b)  demonstrated  that  the  fronto-central  negativity
elicited by feedback stimuli can be selectively sensitive to monetary losses or to
performance  errors,  depending  on  which  was  emphasized  by  the  feedback
stimulus, or in other words, depending on the context in which the information
was provided.
 Feedback  ERN  amplitude  depends  on  the  relation  between  actual  versus
expected outcome: Studies involving gambling tasks (see for example Holroyd,
Nieuwenhuis,  Yeung  and  Cohen,  2003;  Holroyd,  Larsen  and  Cohen,  2004)
suggested that the feedback ERN is not sensitive to the absolute magnitude of
the reward but to deviations from the expected value. Nieuwenhuis et al. (2004a)
stated that "the feedback ERN behaves as if it reflects a reward prediction error."
 The feedback ERN is generated in the anterior cingulate cortex (ACC).
The  RL-ERN  theory  argues  that  the  FRN  (or  feedback  ERN)  is  generated  when
outcomes are evaluated as worse than expected. Holroyd and Coles (2002), as well as
Gehring and Willoughby (2002) related the FRN to the processing of reward value and
the motivational significance of ongoing events. The latter employed a simple monetary
gambling task and found a negative frontal  deflection (de facto an FRN but termed
medial frontal negativity, MFN by the authors) greater in amplitude for losses than gains
and presumably generated in the ACC. Gehring and Willoughby (2002) proposed that
the MFN may reflect an evaluation of the motivational impact of outcome events. A
study  by  Yeung,  Holroyd  and  Cohen  (2005)  pointed  into  a  similar  direction  also
indicating that motivational factors influence processing in the ACC.
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Running different versions of monetary gambling tasks, the authors demonstrated that
even if participants had no influence on the outcome (no-response task:  participants'
only  requirement  was  to  attend  to  the  outcome),  an  FRN  –  or  simply  feedback
negativity (FN), as the authors named it (the nomenclature of Yeung et al. (2005) shall
be used in the following) – was observed differing significantly between loss and gain
trials. The amplitude of the component was smaller in the no-response task than in the
choice-task,  where participants could actively select  one of the alternatives and thus
experienced contingency upon their response choices and the outcome. The reduction in
FN amplitude in the no-response task was correlated with reduced participants' ratings
of subjective involvement in the task. According to Yeung, Holroyd and Cohen (2005)
this finding indicates that the evaluative process indexed by the FN is sensitive to the
motivational significance of ongoing events.
By observing the feedback negativity in the absence of response choices, Yeung et al.
(2005) addressed the question of whether FNs are also generated when the subjects' task
is  to  simply  look  at  stimuli  which  inform  them  about  monetary  rewards  and
punishments (Nieuwenhuis et al. 2004a). Based on their results, Yeung, Holroyd and
Cohen  (2005)  suggested  that  the  FN  reflects  the  reward  signal  alone  and  not,  as
speculated  by  Holroyd  and  Coles  (2002),  its  use  to  reinforce  or  punish  a  recent
response. Proposing an extension of the reinforcement learning framework, Yeung et al.
(2005) presumed that the ACC also uses reward signals to learn about contingencies in
the  external  environment.  Expectations  about  these  environmental  contingencies  are
seen  as  covert  responses  that  may be  reinforced  or  punished.  On  this  note  Yeung,
Holroyd and Cohen (2005) advocated an inclusion of learning that is not specifically
related  to  recently  executed  actions  into  the  reinforcement  learning  theory  of  the
ERN/FN.
Before developing research questions  concerning the FN and Ultimatum bargaining,
some findings about anonymity and social distance in experimental economics shall be
summarized.
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3 Economic games and the influence of social
factors on decision-making
Growing scientific interest concerns the influence of social  preferences on economic
behavior.  Laboratory subjects frequently choose not to maximize their  own material
gains in the presence of social influences, as for example demonstrated by responders in
the Ultimatum Game who reject positive monetary offers, presumably to punish their
unfair partners (Güth et al., 1982, Camerer and Thaler, 1995; Roth, 1995).
Solnick  and  Schweitzer  (1999)  presented  experimental  findings  that  Ultimatum
bargaining  is  affected  by  physical  attractiveness  and  Hoffman,  McCabe  and  Smith
(1996b)  showed  that  behavior  in  the  Dictator  Game  (a  modified  version  of  the
Ultimatum Game, where responders do not have the chance to reject offers) is sensitive
to whether the dictator feels observed by the experimenter in his choices or not.
Van't Wout and Sanfey (2008) listed some research on the Trust Game (Berg, Dickhaut
and McCabe, 1995) demonstrating the influence of several experimental variables on
game behavior. In a standard Trust Game two anonymous players, an investor and a
partner, interact with each other. Being endowed with a certain amount of money, the
investor can allocate any share of the total amount to the partner. The money transferred
is multiplied by the experimenter, usually by a factor of 3 or 4. Subsequently the partner
has the chance to return any portion of the multiplied amount. Honoring trust, he can
allocate more money than transferred by the investor and both players end up with a
higher  payoff.  If  the partner abuses  trust,  he gains  a lot  while the investor ends up
having  less  than  the  primary  endowment.  Labeling  the  game  mate  "opponent"  or
"partner", implying cooperation or competition, affected the investor's decision-making,
resulting in half as much trusting behavior interacting with an "opponent" (Burnham,
McCabe and Smith, 2000). Delgado et al. (2005) found that the investors' willingness to
trust is modulated by information about the social and moral status of their counterparts.
Partners described as having high moral character were trusted more often. Van't Wout
and Sanfey (2008) themselves could demonstrate that high facial  trustworthiness,  as
subjectively rated by investors, leads people to transfer bigger amounts of money.
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3.1. Social distance and anonymity
Although  almost  every  field  interaction  takes  place  with  protagonists  having  full
knowledge  of  their  counterparts,  the  standard  procedure  in  experimental  economics
continues to be anonymity among participants. There are some studies (see for example
Bohnet and Frey, 1999; Burnham, 2003; Charness and Gneezy, 2008) seeking to vary
the  degree  of  social  distance  between  the  protagonists  in  economic  games  by
manipulating the amount of information which players receive about their counterparts.
Charness and Gneezy (2008) compared gambling behavior in Dictator and Ultimatum
Games with anonymity among the players with the same games involving subjects who
were told the family names of their partner. It could be shown that dictators behaved
more generous, providing a significantly bigger share, when names were revealed. The
fact  that  this kind of social  information did not have an effect  on Ultimatum Game
offers was explained with the "nature" of the game. Charness and Gneezy (2008) argued
that impulses of generosity are crowded out by strategic considerations.
Burnham  (2003)  also  ran  Dictator  Games,  but  these  consisted  of  three  different
conditions:  "no photo",  "dictator  photo"  and "recipient  photo".  While  in  the second
condition  the  recipient  was  given  a  photograph  of  the  dictator  together  with  his
decision,  dictators  saw an  instant  photograph  of  their  counterparts  before  making a
decision in the third one. The results were in line with those of Charness and Gneezy
(2008).  Dictators'  giving behavior  in  the  two photo conditions  differed significantly
from  the  "no  photo"  condition:  25  %  of  the  dictators  in  each  of  the  photograph
conditions  allocated half  of  the total  amount  compared  to  3.8  % in the  "no  photo"
condition. Burnham (2003) presumed, referring to Schelling's observation that people
give  more  when  they  know  particulars  about  the  recipient  ("identifiable  victim"
concept;  Schelling, 1968),  that dictators in the "recipient photo" condition felt more
empathy towards their  photographed and thus  identifiable game partners.  An fMRI-
study by Rilling et al. (2004) may be of interest in this context. The authors scanned
participants while they were playing the Ultimatum Game (and the Prisoner's Dilemma
Game) with human and computer counterparts, investigating whether partner decisions
activated different brain areas. Being confronted with offers from human partners (who
were introduced via a photograph), responders showed stronger activity (as compared to
computer  offers)  in  brain  areas  associated  with  a  presumed theory  of  mind  neural
30
network. Responders also rejected unfair offers from human partners more frequently.
These results may be linked to studies manipulating the degree of social distance in
economic  games,  as  responders  in  the  Rilling  et  al.  (2004)  study showed  different
behavior and cortical activity after being confronted with offers of a partner whom they
were able to identify. Thus one could hypothesize that social closeness may also have
some explanatory value for the findings of Rilling et al. (2004).
Bohnet and Frey formulated a hierarchy of "institutional characteristics" (1995) which
defines the extent to which fairness considerations are active: In an anonymous setting,
people only have an intrinsic motivation to behave fairly; the fairness norm is partially
activated  when  people  are  given  the  chance  to  identify  each  other;  and  with  the
possibility to communicate, the fairness norm is strongly active (cited after Charness
and  Gneezy,  2008).  In  one  of  two  related  experiments,  Bohnet  and  Frey  (1999)
employed the Dictator Game in three condition conditions:  "Anonymity",  "One-way
identification" and "One-way identification with information".  In  the second and the
third variant of the game, dictators knew who their potential recipients were but not vice
versa. One-way identification was realized by giving dictators the possibility to visually
identify their respective recipients, while in the other session they additionally received
information (for example name and provenance) about their game mates. Bohnet and
Frey (1999) observed that dictators offered most when they were given the chance to
learn more about who their counterpart was; visual identification alone led to higher
solidarity rates as compared to the anonymous variant of the game.
The reported studies clearly indicate that social distance or closeness, as manipulated
via information that players in economic games receive about their counterparts, plays a
crucial role in decision-making. Indeed most of the research focused on the proposer
(respectively the  investor  or  dictator)  and  how knowledge  about  his  game  partners
affects his behavior.  The work at  hand concentrates  on responders in an Ultimatum
Game setting and tries to investigate how varying degrees of social distance influence
their fairness considerations and behavior.
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4 Research question
The preceding chapters presented a compendium of findings from behavioral economics
and neuroscience concerning bargaining behavior, negative ERP-components sensitive
to errors and performance feedback, and social factors influencing decision-making. In
an attempt to integrate these insights, the work at hand addresses the question whether
the perception of (un)fairness, as experienced in an economic game, is influenced by the
degree  of  social  distance  among  the  interacting  players.  We  recorded
electroencephalograms  while  participants  were  in  the  role  of  the  responder  in  an
Ultimatum  Game  setting  (Güth  et  al.,  1982).  Social  distance  was  manipulated  via
information provided to the subjects about their presumed counterparts. Proposers were
either introduced via a photograph, accompanied by social information (name and age),
or presented anonymously (simply entitled as "Proposer"). We expected that Ultimatum
Game  offers  generate  a  feedback  negativity  (FN)  and  that  the  variation  of  social
distance is reflected in the amplitude of this component.
The central research question of this diploma thesis was motivated by Nieuwenhuis et
al.'s proposal (2004a) to investigate whether FNs are also elicited when participants'
assignment  is  to  solely look  at  stimuli  informing  them about  monetary rewards  or
punishments. In fact, there is empirical evidence suggesting that an FN is also generated
in  the  absence  of  choice  or  responding.  As  mentioned  above,  Yeung  et  al.  (2005)
observed an FN in a monetary gambling task, without active response choice or action
being required from the participants. Donkers, Nieuwenhuis and van Boxtel (2005) also
reported an "FRN-like mediofrontal negativity" being elicited by outcomes that were
not contingent on any preceding choice or action. Running a slot-machine task, in which
three digits, successively presented on a screen, informed participants about gains and
losses, the authors could show that the outcomes were associated with a FN, although
they were not preceded by any choice or action, i. e. no response was required of the
subjects.
Employing a modified version of the Eriksen flanker task (Eriksen and Eriksen, 1974),
van Schie, Mars, Coles and Bekkering (2004) demonstrated that committing an error as
well as watching others committing an error elicited an ERN, supporting the hypothesis
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that this component can occur even without preceding action or response.
Analyzing  responders'  behavior  and  neural  activation  patterns  while  they  view
Ultimatum Game offers before deciding whether to accept them or not could also be an
appropriate way to follow Nieuwenhuis et al.'s suggestion.
Any accepted UG offer results in a material gain for the responder. Nonetheless, low
offers may in their perception be equivalent to monetary losses or punishments, taking
into  account  that  50-50  splits  are  deemed  to  be  a  social  norm  or  a  fair  outcome
(Burnham, 2003; Chang and Sanfey, 2009). If responders expect a fair share, low offers
probably equal a violation of their assumptions concerning their counterparts' behavior.
Following  the  diction  of  the  reinforcement  learning  theory,  low  offers  may  be
considered to be 'worse than expected' and therefore provoke the generation of an FN.
Nieuwenhuis et al. (2004a) presumed that the FN reflects a good-bad evaluation and
that  its  amplitude depends on the relation between actual  versus  expected outcome.
Based on these predictions and keeping in mind that responders have been reported to
count on a fair outcome (a 50-50 share) in the Ultimatum Game, we expect the FN
amplitude to be influenced by the type of offer made. In this sense, unfair offers should
be associated with large FNs, fair offers with small ones.
Perceived  social  closeness  among  participants  in  experimental  games  affects  their
behavior.  As  Bohnet  and  Frey (1995)  pointed  out,  fairness  considerations  are  more
active  when  people  have  the  possibility  to  identify  each  other  compared  to  an
anonymous setting. Here we check responders' perception of different Ultimatum Game
offers  coming from identifiable versus  anonymous proposers.  Receiving information
(photograph, name and age) about the counterpart may additionally activate responders'
fairness considerations and add to form expectations about the other player's behavior.
Hence it could be assumed that low offers from identifiable proposers are considered to
be more unfair than the numerically identical offers from an anonymous counterpart.
We  expect  this  difference  to  be  reflected  in  the  FN  amplitude,  with  unfair  offers
ascribed to familiar proposers being followed by larger FNs.
This study also investigates the neural substrate for the perception of (un)fair offers in
the Ultimatum Game. In line with several studies (e. g. Miltner et al., 1997; Gehring and
Willoughby, 2002), we expect the FN to be generated in or near the ACC.
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Summing up, the aims of this diploma thesis are twofold: First, we attempt to replicate
the results reported by Polezzi et al. (2008), who directly linked the Ultimatum Game
and the FN and found that  a distinction between fair and other  kinds of offers was
reflected  in  the  FN  amplitude.  Second,  the  influence  of  social  closeness  versus
anonymity on the perception of Ultimatum Game offers shall be investigated.
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Empirical Part
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5 Materials and methods
5.1. Participants
Thirty right-handed subjects – fifteen women, fifteen men – with normal or corrected-
to-normal vision participated in this study. Handedness was assessed by the Edinburgh
Handedness Inventory (Oldfield, 1971). Participants were recruited on a volunteer and
informed consent basis, meeting federal and local ethic standards. All subjects were free
of neurological diseases and had no psychiatric history. To achieve higher homogeneity
and  comparability  of  the  sample,  we  recruited  participants  similar  in  age  for  the
experiment. In fact, the volunteers'  age ranged from 18 to 31 years, with a mean of
24.27 (standard deviation [SD] = 3.94).  Prior to participation, subjects were briefed
about the procedure and possible risks of an EEG-study and written informed consent
was  obtained  from  each  participant.  Subjects  were  instructed  that  individual
remuneration would depend on choice behavior in the task (with a possible range from
5 to 10 Euros). Essentially, every participant received 10 Euros after the experiment was
concluded, independent of actual choices.
5.2. Task
Before the experimental session started, subjects were asked to complete a personality
questionnaire (NEO-FFI, Borkenau and Ostendorf, 1993), the results of which are not
included in the current diploma thesis.
A modified version of the Ultimatum Game (UG) was administered. As Rilling et al.
(2004) put it, the UG is a two-player game in which the responder learns whether the
proposer is generous or greedy. Here a single-shot version of the game was used with
players splitting 10 Euros in each round. Subjects played as responders and received a
single offer from each proposer. After being confronted with proposers' offers of how to
split  the money,  the participants'  task was to  decide whether  to  accept  or  reject  the
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proposed  division.  A 3  x  2  design  was  realized,  containing  three  different  OFFER
conditions (see Polezzi et al., 2008) and two SOCIAL DISTANCE conditions, resulting
in six different modes of item configuration (see Table 1).
Offers "Social distance" conditions Modes of item configuration 
 Fair (5-5 split)
 Midfair (7-3)
 Unfair (9-1)
 Anonymity
 Information
 Fair/Anonymity
 Midfair/Anonymity
 Unfair/Anonymity
 Fair/Information
 Midfair/Information
 Unfair/Information
Table 1: Conditions of our modified Ultimatum Game.
Participants were told that the proposers' offers had been collected in a pilot study. In
fact,  offers  were  manipulated  by  the  experimenter  in  order  to  guarantee  the  same
number of trials for every condition. Each of the six conditions contained 48 items,
resulting  in  a  total  of  288  Ultimatum  Game  rounds  to  play.  In  the  course  of  the
experiment, responders were confronted with 144 identifiable proposers (72 women and
72 men: condition information: photograph (frontal view of the face), first and second
name and age of the proposer were presented),  as well  as with 144 non-identifiable
counterparts (entitled as "Proposer"; condition anonymity). Photographs were in black-
and-white and aligned in the center of the screen, 8,5 centimeters in height, and 7,5
centimeters in width (vertical and horizontal resolution: 72 dpi). Mean age of female
and male proposers was 24.81 ([SD] = 3.31), respectively 27.18 years ([SD] = 3.91).
Fair, midfair und unfair offers were equally distributed on the two SOCIAL DISTANCE
conditions, i.  e. responders viewed the same number of different types of offers (48
each)  made  by  identifiable  and  anonymous  proposers  (see  also  Figure  5).  In  our
information condition, the number of fair, midfair and unfair offers was counterbalanced
between female and male proposers (24 offers for each offer-gender combination).
The  item material  (including photographs)  was  entirely  generated  by ourselves  and
stimulus presentation and synchronization with the EEG data collection was controlled
by E-Prime 2.0 (Psychology Software Tools, Inc.; http://www.pstnet.com).
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5.3. Procedure
Participants  performed  the  Ultimatum  Game  being  comfortably  seated  about  70
centimetres in  front of  a  19-in.  CRT computer  monitor in a  sound-attenuated room.
Before  data  collection  started,  the  instructions  were  presented  in  written  form (see
Appendix A for instructions in German).
The experiment consisted of four blocks with 72 trials each, offers being presented in
randomized  order.  After  each  block,  a  pause  was  provided  in  which  subjects  were
informed about the amount of money they had gained so far. Prior to the experiment,
participants were instructed that individual payoff would be calculated via a predefined
key to convert game money amounts and would be determined by their choice behavior,
being maximal (10 Euros) for accepting all offers and minimal (5 Euros) for rejecting
every single one. In fact, every subject was rewarded 10 Euros for the participation in
our study. Financial compensation was intended to advance participants' motivation on
the  task  (see  Hertwig  et  al.,  2001)  and  to  achieve  a  closer  approximation  to  real
economic behavior.
An information trial (see also Figure 6 (a)) was made up by the following sequence: It
started  with  a  black  asterisk on  a  grey  screen,  having  a  duration  of  2  seconds.
Subsequently, the proposer was introduced via a photograph, and her/his name and age
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Figure 5: Trial structure in our modified UG version. See text for explanations.
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(written in black letters) for another 2 seconds. Then, the proposer's offer appeared on
the screen, showing two numbers, framed in black and arranged one below the other.
The digit on the bottom of the screen corresponded to the part of the 10 Euros provided
to  the  responder.  After  1.5  seconds,  the  German  words  for  accept  and  reject  (see
Appendix A for instructions in German) were shown in the right respectively left lower
corner of the screen. In the course of the experiment, the positions of the two possible
answers varied at random. Participants were asked to press a button on the keyboard
(either '1' or '2') according to the location of the alternative they had chosen ('1' for the
alternative  appearing on  the  left  side and  '2'  for  the  alternative  on  the  right).  After
having decided to accept or reject an offer, participants were asked to what extent their
expectations concerning their counterparts' offering were met. The German words for
'Expectations met?' were presented, together with the alternatives 'disappointed', 'met'
and  'exceeded',  arranged  next  to  each  other  in  the  lower  section  of  the  screen  (4
seconds). Participants had to decide by pressing key '1', '2' or '3' , corresponding to the
screen-postion of the choice alternative they had opted for.  The question concerning
responders' expectations was added to the classic Ultimatum Game design in order to
check ex post whether social information effectively formed expectations and whether
effects  of  this  manipulation  would  be  observed  in  choice  behavior.  To  allow  a
comparison between  anonymity and  information trials,  the expectations-question was
also administered in trials with non-identifiable proposers. Subjects were asked to act
based on their  general  assumptions regarding social  exchange situations.  They were
instructed to decide according to their general expectations (probably considerations of
fairness and reciprocity) concerning counterparts' behavior in an economic setting like
the Ultimatum Game. A single information trial lasted approximately 12 seconds.
In principle, an anonymity trial (see Figure 6 (b)) was very similar in structure: Again a
black asterisk on an grey screen  was blended  for  2  seconds,  before the responders'
counterpart was presented. To ensure anonymity, no social information was provided
but the word 'Proposer' appeared on the computer monitor for another 2 seconds. The
offer  and  associated  choice  alternatives  were  followed  by  the  presentation  of  the
question  concerning  responders'  expectations  accompanied  by  possible  answers.
Procedure and timing were identical compared to an information trial.
Altogether, the experiment had a duration of around 65 minutes (pauses included).
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5.4. EEG recording
The  electroencephalogram  (EEG)  was  recorded  using  61  Ag/AgCl  electrodes
equidistantly  embedded  in  an  elastic  electrode  cap  (EASYCAP  GmbH;
http://www.easycap.de, model M10). Prior to the participant's preparation for the EEG-
session, we measured the individual three-dimensional coordinates of 17 pre-defined
electrode locations (referenced to nasion, inion, and the two preauricular electrodes)
using  a  photogrammetric  head  digitizer  (3D-PHD;  Bauer et  al., 2000).  Off-line  a
standard  head  model  was  fit  into  these  pre-defined  electrode  positions  in  order  to
interpolate missing electrodes based on the equidistant electrode montage.
A balanced sterno-vertebral reference (Stephenson and Gibbs, 1951), positioned above
the seventh vertebra and the right sterno-clavicular joint, was used to obtain a true non-
cephalic recording reference. Vertical and horizontal electrooculograms (EOGs) were
recorded  with  a  bipolar  setting  to  allow the  elimination  of  artifacts  related  to  eye
movements and blinks. Electrodes were placed 1 centimeter above and below the left
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Figure 6: Timeline for a single (a) information UG trial and (b) anonymity UG trial. Each trial lasted
approximately 12 seconds. See text for explanations.
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eye, and on the outer canthi of both eyes. The subjects' scalp was cautiously scratched at
each electrode site employing a sterile single-use needle (Picton and Hillyard, 1972) in
order  to  minimize  skin  potential  artifacts  and  to  ascertain  homogeneous  and  stable
electrode impedances below 2 k. Electrodes and adaptors were filled with degassed
electrode  gel  (Electro-Gel,  Electrode-Cap  International,  Inc.,  Eaton/OH,  USA).  In
succession, impedances were checked for each electrode using an impedance meter. If
necessary (impedance > 2 k), the skin scratching procedure was repeated. All signals
were recorded within a frequency range of 0.1 to 125 Hz and sampled at 250 Hz for
digital storage.
5.5. Data analysis
5.5.1.    Behavioral data  
For the analysis of reaction times (RTs) between the presentation of the UG offer and
the  decision  whether  to  accept  or  reject  it,  a  2  x  3  repeated  measures  analysis  of
variance (ANOVA) was performed with the factors SOCIAL DISTANCE (anonymity vs.
information) and OFFER (fair, midfair and unfair). Before, RTs were transformed using
a logarithmic function (as suggested by Knutson et al., 2007; cited after Polezzi et al.,
2008).  We additionally calculated planned contrasts  for  the analysis of  the different
factor levels.  Mean absolute frequencies of acceptances  for the different offers were
checked with the non-parametric Friedman Test. Post-hoc analysis was accomplished
employing Wilcoxon signed-rank tests applying a Bonferroni correction. To investigate
whether  acceptances  differed  with  the  type  of  offer  in  both  SOCIAL DISTANCE
conditions,  six comparisons were conducted. Additionally,  we were interested in the
acceptance  behavior  for  numerically  identical  offers  made  by  identifiable  and  non-
identifiable proposers, which is why three more tests were computed (fair-anonymity vs.
fair-information,  midfair-anonymity vs.  midfair-information,  unfair-anonymity vs.
unfair-information). As nine comparisons were carried out, all effects are reported at a
P = 0.006 level of significance.
In  our  Ultimatum Game design,  subjects  had  four  seconds  to  decide whether  their
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expectations  concerning  the  offer  of  their  counterparts  were  'disappointed',  'met'  or
'exceeded'. This time window was apparently not long enough for all participants in
every single trial.  We dealt  with the issue of missing data by calculating 3 separate
ANOVAs for  the  examination  of  RTs,  excluding missing  values  if  necessary.  These
ANOVAs were  computed  with  the  factors  (1)  SOCIAL DISTANCE (anonymity vs.
information),  (2)  OFFER  (fair,  midfair  and  unfair)  and  (3)  EXPECTATION
(disappointed,  met  and  exceeded).  Again  RTs were  transformed using a  logarithmic
function and planned contrasts were calculated.  Five subjects  were excluded due to
missing data in analysis (3). To address the question whether frequencies for choosing
the  alternatives  'disappointed',  'met'  and  'exceeded'  were  affected  by  SOCIAL
DISTANCE (anonymity  vs.  information),  nine  Wilcoxon  tests  were  performed.  All
effects  are  therefore  reported  at  a  P =  0.006  level  of  significance  (Bonferroni
correction).  The following comparisons were calculated:  fair-anonymity-disappointed
vs.  fair-information-disappointed;  fair-anonymity-met vs.  fair-information  met;  fair-
anonymity-exceeded vs. fair-information-exceeded;  midfair-anonymity-disappointed vs.
midfair-information-disappointed;  midfair-anonymity-met vs.  midfair-information-met;
midfair-anonymity-exceeded vs.  midfair-information-exceeded;  unfair-anonymity-
disappointed vs.  unfair-information-disappointed;  unfair-anonymity-met vs.  unfair-
information-met;  unfair-anonymity-exceeded vs. unfair-information-exceeded.
If  necessary,  degrees  of  freedom  were  adjusted  using  the  Greenhouse-Geisser
correction. All effects are reported as significant at P  0.05.
5.5.2.    EEG data  
Prior to the analysis, artifacts due to eye movements and blinks were removed offline
using a linear regression approach with channel-specific correction coefficients. EOG
parameters were assessed separately for vertical and horizontal eye movements in pre-
experimental  EOG  calibration  trials  in  which  subjects  performed  regular  eye
movements  (Bauer  and  Lauber,  1979).  To  calculate  blink  coefficients,  a  template
matching procedure  was  used (see Vitouch,  Bauer,  Gittler,  Leodolter  and Leodolter,
1997;  Lamm,  Fischmeister  and  Bauer,  2005,  for  a  detailed description).  Employing
these  parameters  weighted  eye  movement  and  blink related  signals  were  subtracted
from each EEG channel trial-by-trial (see also Fischmeister and Bauer, 2006).
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We carried out off-line analysis using EEGLAB 6.03b (Delorme and Makeig, 2004),
implemented in Matlab 7.5.0 (The MathWorks). EEG data were low-pass filtered with a
cut-off frequency of 30 Hz (roll-off 6 dB per octave). EEG epochs of 1200 milliseconds
were extracted, starting 200 milliseconds before the presentation of Ultimatum Game
(UG) offers. The interval of 200 milliseconds preceding the offer's onset served as a
baseline.
To exclude artifact contaminated trials, a semi-automatic procedure was applied. Trials
meeting the following criteria were labelled and finally rejected after visual inspection:
voltage values exceeding +/-75V in any channel or a voltage drift of more than 75V.
Muscular or movement artifact-afflicted trials (if not automatically marked) were also
rejected based on visual inspection. Because of high numbers of artifact contaminated
trials, 7 subjects (4 women and 3 men) had to be excluded from further analysis. The
remaining sample consisted of 23 participants, 11 women and 12 men, with a mean age
of 23.96 years ([SD] = 4.07).
5.5.3.    ERP data  
Artifact-free trials were averaged per condition and subject, and grand averages were
calculated for each of the following six conditions: (1) fair offer/anonymous proposer
(fair-anonymity), (2) midfair offer/anonymous proposer (midfair-anonymity), (3) unfair
offer/anonymous proposer (unfair-anonymity), (4) fair offer/identifiable proposer (fair-
information),  (5)  midfair  offer/identifiable  proposer  (midfair-information),  and  (6)
unfair offer/identifiable proposer (unfair-information).
Subsequently, mean amplitude measures were calculated for the interval of 200 to 300
milliseconds after the onset of the Ultimatum Game offer. This time window for FN
measurement was defined after visual inspection of the grand mean (mean across all
averages)  and  in  line  with  relevant  literature  (see  for  example  Nieuwenhuis  et  al.,
2004b).  The mean amplitudes of  our 23 participants were subjected to a  4 x 2 x 3
repeated measures ANOVA with the factors LOCATION (electrode sites FCz, Fz, Cz and
Pz), SOCIAL DISTANCE (anonymity vs. information) and OFFER (fair, midfair and
unfair).
Additionally, we calculated peak-to-peak voltage differences at electrode Fz. We chose
this electrode based on visual inspection of the grand mean and consistent with relevant
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literature (see for example Gehring and Willoughby, 2002). The difference between the
first negative peak 200-300 milliseconds after the onset of the UG offer and the average
voltage value of the immediately preceding and following positive peak was measured.
This procedure was employed according to Polezzi et al. (2008). We performed peak
detection using BRL peak finder v.0.1b, implemented in EEGLAB, and subjected the
peak  amplitudes  to  a  2  x  3  repeated  measures  ANOVA with  the  factors  SOCIAL
DISTANCE (anonymity vs. information) and OFFER (fair, midfair and unfair). Planned
contrasts were calculated subsequently.
FN peak latencies were computed at electrode Fz, from the onset of UG offers to the
peak amplitude. With theses latency values, a 2 x 3 repeated measures ANOVA with the
factors SOCIAL DISTANCE (anonymity vs. information) and OFFER (fair, midfair and
unfair) was carried out.
For all computations, the Greenhouse-Geisser correction for violations of the  ANOVA
assumption of sphericity was applied when appropriate. The significance threshold was
set at P  0.05, two-tailed.
5.5.4.    Source analysis  
Standardized  low-resolution  brain  electromagnetic  tomography (sLORETA;  Pascual-
Marqui, 2002) was used for the localization of the neural generator of the feedback
negativity. Mean amplitudes between 60 and 460 milliseconds after the onset of the UG
offer were extracted (with a step size of 20 milliseconds), resulting in three-dimensional
distributions of cortical activation for each subject and condition.
sLORETA is  a  distributed  source  modeling  method  that  computes  statistical  maps
indicating the locations of the underlying source processes with low error. These maps
are  derived  on  the  basis  of  a  location  wise  inverse  weighting  of  the  results  of  a
Minimum  Norm  Least  Squares  (MNLS)  analysis  with  their  estimated  variances.
Estimated source variances are computed from the measurement noise, as well as from
prior source variances (Pascual-Marqui, 2002; Wagner, Fuchs and Kastner, 2004). To
find  single  solutions  for  EEG  inverse  problems,  sLORETA  is  assuming  similar
activation of neighboring neuronal sources. Being based on a minimum-norm approach,
it  does  not  require  any information about  the number,  localization, configuration or
extent of these sources. Under ideal conditions, sLORETA has been proven to have no
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or minimal localization bias (Greenblatt, Ossadtchi and Pflieger, 2005; Sekihara, Sahani
and Nagarajan, 2005).
VEOG,  HEOG  and  ECG,  as  well  as  the  preauricular  electrodes  A1  and  A2  were
excluded from analysis. The remaining individual electrode coordinates, acquired via
3D-PHD, were cross-registered to the standard Talairach atlas (Talairach and Tournoux,
1988). sLORETA's solution space is restricted to cortical grey matter and hippocampus,
defined via the MNI (Montreal  Neurological  Institute)  reference brain.  The realistic
head model used is subdivided  into 6239 voxel, with a spatial resolution of 5 x 5 x 5
mm³.  With  the  algorithm  of  Brett,  Johnsrude  and  Owen  (2002),  MNI  space  is
transformed to Talairach space. sLORETA computes the electric activity at each voxel
as  the squared standardized magnitude of the estimated current density.  We chose a
regularization  parameter  of  zero  for  the  transformation  to  achieve  the  smoothest
possible inverse solution. Overall signal-to-noise-ratio was set at a value of 100 within
the transformation process.
sLORETA solutions of grand average ERPs were calculated for a descriptive analysis of
our  six  conditions.  For  the  comparison  of  our  conditions  we  used  Statistical
nonparametric  Mapping  (SnPM;  Nichols  and  Holmes,  2002),  implemented  in  the
sLORETA  software.  Different  OFFER  conditions  (fair,  midfair  and  unfair)  were
contrasted  as  well  as  the  two  SOCIAL  DISTANCE  conditions  anonymity and
information.  SnPM  compares  two  groups  voxel  by  voxel  across  all  time-points,
separately  for  all  subjects,  and  calculates  dependent-sample  t-values  using  log-
transformed  sLORETA  values.  The  resulting  Tmax statistic  is  based  on  5000
permutations, i. e. randomly drawn configurations of data of conditions tested against
the original configuration. We set the significance level at P  0.05, two-tailed.
45
6 Results
6.1. Behavioral results
6.1.1.    Reaction times – Ultimatum Game offer  
As illustrated in Figure 7, RTs differed significantly with the type of OFFER [F(2, 44) =
23.489,  P < 0.001].  Planned contrasts  revealed that  decisions about fair  offers  were
executed more quickly than midfair [F(1, 22) = 58.443, P < 0.001] and unfair ones [F(1,
22) = 15.739,  P < 0.01]. Unfair offers were associated with shorter RTs than midfair
offers [F(1, 22) = 7.404, P < 0.05]. Non-transformed mean RTs were 1154 milliseconds
for fair, 1448 ms for midfair and 1313 ms for unfair offers. The overall mean RT for the
three types of offers was 1305 milliseconds ([SD] = 752.3). No effects for SOCIAL
DISTANCE or the interaction of the two factors were observed. 
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Figure 7: RTs for the different types of offers. Non transformed values are displayed as
well. Error bars indicate the 95 % confidence interval [CI].
1154 ms
1448 ms
1313 ms
6.1.2.    Acceptances  
Acceptances  (see  also Figure  8)  were  significantly affected  by the  type  of  OFFER
[2(5) = 89.159, P < 0.001]. Mean ranks and acceptance rates are displayed in Table 2.
Mean absolute acceptance frequencies for fair offers were higher than for midfair, and
unfair offers respectively in both SOCIAL DISTANCE conditions [anonymity: T = 6, Z
= -3.590, P < 0.001; T = 0, Z = -4.217, P < 0.001; information: T = 3.5, Z = -3.572, P <
0.001; T = 0, Z = -4.224, P < 0.001]. The differences between midfair and unfair offers
were also significant  in  both conditions [anonymity:  T = 0,  Z = -4.017,  P < 0.001;
information:  T = 1.5,  Z = -4.059,  P < 0.001]. Comparing numerically identical offers
between the SOCIAL DISTANCE conditions did not yield any significant differences.
Acceptance rates
condition mean ranks percentages
fair-anonymity 5.17 98.73
midfair-anonymity 3.85 66.67
unfair-anonymity 1.67 10.04
fair-information 5.04 98.55
midfair-information 3.70 63.86
unfair-information 1.57 6.52
Table 2: Acceptance rates of different Ultimatum Game offers. Mean ranks and percentages are
displayed.
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6.1.3.    Reaction times – Expectations  
RTs did not differ significantly between the two SOCIAL DISTANCE conditions [F(1,
22) = 0, P = 0.999], different types of OFFERs [F(2, 44) = 1.930, P = 0.157], nor with
the three alternatives 'disappointed', 'met' and 'exceeded' of the factor EXPECTATION
[F(2, 34) = 2.721,  P = 0.080]. Planned contrasts in the latter analysis indicated that
button press '1' (expectations 'disappointed') was associated with longer RTs than button
press  '2'  (expectations  'met')  [F(1,  17)  =  7.900,  P <  0.05]  (see  also  Figure  9).
Corresponding non-transformed RTs were 953 milliseconds for 'disappointed', 917 ms
for 'met' and 945 ms for 'exceeded'. The overall mean RT for the different alternatives
was 937 milliseconds ([SD] = 675.83).
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Figure 8: Acceptances for different types of offers, displayed in mean absolute frequencies
(maximum = 48, as each of the six conditions contained 48 trials). Error bars indicate the 95 %
confidence interval [CI].
6.1.4.    Choice behavior  
We compared the same types of offers and identical choices regarding the expectations-
question  between  the  two  SOCIAL  DISTANCE  conditions  (e.g.  fair-anonymity-
disappointed vs.  fair-information-disappointed). Choice behavior (frequencies) in our
six  conditions  in  combination  with  different  EXPECTATION levels  is  displayed  in
Table 3.
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Figure 9: RTs for button press '1', '2' and '3', corresponding to expectations 'disappointed',
'met' and 'exceeded'. Non transformed values are displayed as well. Five subjects were
excluded from analysis due to missing data. Error bars indicate the 95 % confidence
953 ms
917 ms
945 ms
Choice behavior
condition expectation percentages
fair-anonymity disappointed 1.48
met 57.60
exceeded 40.93
midfair-anonymity disappointed 43.21
met 54.33
exceeded 2.48
unfair-anonymity disappointed 89.47
met 10.36
exceeded 0.18
fair-information disappointed 0.83
met 57.86
exceeded 41.32
midfair-information disappointed 43.40
met 48.50
exceeded 8.10
unfair-information disappointed 80.73
met 17.73
exceeded 1.54
Table 3: Choice behavior regarding the expectations-question. Percentages are displayed.
The  only  difference  approaching  significance  was  observed  between  midfair-
anonymity-exceeded and midfair-information-exceeded [T = 94, Z = -2.612, P = 0.009]
(see also Figure 10).
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Figure 10: Frequencies for choosing 'disappointed', 'met' and 'exceeded' in the expectations-
question, displayed for our six conditions split by SOCIAL DISTANCE. Upper panel:
Anonymity. Lower panel: Information.
6.2. ERP data
ERPs  elicited  by  our  six  conditions  (fair-information,  midfair-information,  unfair-
information;  fair-anonymity,  midfair-anonymity,  unfair-anonymity)  are  presented  in
Figure 11 at  electrode Fz.  As can be seen in this grand mean plot,  a distinct  FN is
apparent in all conditions.
6.2.1.    FN mean amplitudes  
No significant main effects or interactions could be observed in the analysis of mean
amplitudes of the FN.
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Figure 11: Grand mean ERP waveforms at electrode Fz for the six conditions. Results of 23
subjects are displayed. The presentation of the UG offer started at 0 ms. The FN is indicated by the
arrow.
6.2.2.    FN peak-to-peak measures  
Peak-to-peak amplitudes of the FN were significantly affected by the type of OFFER
[F(2,  44)  =  5.989,  P <  0.01].  Planned  contrasts  revealed  that  FN amplitudes  were
smaller for fair as compared to midfair [F(1, 22) = 6.158,  P < 0.05] and unfair offers
[F(1,  22)  =  13.793,  P <  0.01].  No  main  effect  for  SOCIAL DISTANCE could  be
observed.
The interaction between SOCIAL DISTANCE and OFFER also reached significance
[F(2, 44) = 3.822, P < 0.05]. Planned contrasts indicated an interaction when comparing
anonymity to information for fair compared to unfair offers [F(1, 22) = 6.993, P < 0.05].
Thus,  information (compared  to  anonymity)  augmented  FN amplitudes  significantly
more for unfair offers than it did for fair offers. The remaining contrasts did not yield
any significant interactions.
Post-hoc analysis was complemented using the Tukey HSD test. Significant differences
were observed comparing fair and midfair,  respectively fair and unfair  offers  in  the
information condition, but not in the anonymity condition (see also Figure 12). Peak-to-
peak amplitudes were smaller for fair offers than for midfair [P = 0.030] and unfair
offers [P = 0.001].
Figures 13 and 14 show the grand mean ERP waveforms (at electrode Fz) elicited by
fair, midfair and unfair UG offers in our information and anonymity condition.
In  Figure  15,  scalp topographies  of  the  voltage  differences  between unfair  and fair
offers  in  the  anonymity and  information condition  are  displayed.  A negativity  with
fronto-central scalp distribution is apparent in the information condition (especially 240
milliseconds after the presentation of the UG offer).
6.2.3.    FN peak latencies  
Latency analysis did not reveal any significant main effects or interactions.
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Figure 13: Grand mean ERP waveforms at electrode Fz for the three conditions fair-information
(printed in blue), midfair-information (red) and unfair-information (green). Results of 23 subjects are
displayed. The presentation of the UG offer started at 0 ms. The FN is indicated by the arrow.
Figure 12: Mean peak-to-peak amplitudes for the six different conditions. Error bars indicate
the 95 % confidence interval [CI].
Anonymity-unfair – anonymity-fair
Information-unfair – information-fair
   230 ms         240 ms   250 ms
Figure 15: Scalp plots of the voltage differences between unfair and fair offers in both SOCIAL
DISTANCE conditions (upper panel: anonymity; lower panel: information). The times given are relative
to the onset of the UG offer.
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Figure 14: Grand mean ERP waveforms at electrode Fz for the three conditions fair-anonymity (printed
in pale blue), midfair-anonymity (pink) and unfair-anonymity (orange). Results of 23 subjects are
displayed. The presentation of the UG offer started at 0 ms. The FN is indicated by the arrow.
6.3. Source analysis
6.3.1.    Descriptives of sLORETA brain activity patterns  
The grand averages of our six conditions (fair-anonymity, midfair-anonymity, unfair-
anonymity;  fair-information,  midfair-information,  unfair-information)  showed similar
activation  patterns  at  FN  latency.  Stable  activity  was  found  in  right-hemispheric
temporal  and  parietal  regions  in  time  frame  9  (220-240  milliseconds  after  the
presentation of the Ultimatum Game offer). sLORETA images of the grand average for
the  condition  unfair-anonymity are  presented  exemplarily  in  Figure  16,  as  activity
distributions were quite similar in our data. Images of the condition midfair-information
are also displayed, showing slightly different patterns of activation (see Appendix for
sLORETA images of the remaining conditions).
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Figure 16: sLORETA images of the grand averages at FN latency (time frame 9: 220-240
milliseconds after the onset of the UG offer) showing current density (estimated voxel activity)
maxima for the conditions unfair-anonymity (upper panel) and midfair-information (lower
panel). MNI-coordinates and anatomical structures are presented (see Table 4 for Brodmann
areas). Estimated cortical activation is shown from three perspectives (axial, sagittal, and coronal
view), displayed with a scale exponent of 5.75. Activation maxima are coded in yellow.
The highest  levels of activation in the conditions  fair-anonymity,  midfair-anonymity,
unfair-anonymity,  fair-information  and  unfair-information were  apparent  in  the
temporal lobe (Brodmann areas 21, 22, 39 and 40). The condition midfair-information
was associated with strong activations in the parietal lobe (Precuneus, Brodmann area
(BA) 19). Table 4 summarizes activation maxima for our six conditions.
Activation maxima with sLORETA
grand averages
condition anatomical region (BA) Talairach coordinates
fair-anonymity Superior Temporal Gyrus (right BA 22) X=64, Y=-43, Z=11
Superior Temporal Gyrus (right BA 22) X=54, Y=-48, Z=12
Superior Temporal Gyrus (right BA 22) X=59, Y=-48, Z=12
midfair-anonymity Middle Temporal Gyrus (right BA 22) X=40, Y=-57, Z=17
Middle Temporal Gyrus (right BA 39) X=45, Y=-62, Z=17
Superior Temporal Gyrus (right BA 22) X=45, Y=-57, Z=17
unfair-anonymity Superior Temporal Gyrus (right BA 22) X=64, Y=-43, Z=11
Middle Temporal Gyrus (right BA 22) X=40, Y=-57, Z=17
Superior Temporal Gyrus (right BA 22) X=64, Y=-43, Z=16
fair-information Supramarginal Gyrus (right BA 40) X=59, Y=-52, Z=21
Superior Temporal Gyrus (right BA 22) X=59, Y=-57, Z=17
Superior Temporal Gyrus (right BA 22) X=54, Y=-57, Z=17
midfair-information Precuneus (right BA 19) X=40, Y=-71, Z=40
Precuneus (right BA 19) X=35, Y=-66, Z=40
Precuneus (right BA 19) X=35, Y=-76, Z=36
unfair-information Superior Temporal Gyrus (right BA 22) X=59, Y=-57, Z=17
Superior Temporal Gyrus (right BA 22) X=64, Y=-48, Z=12
Superior Temporal Gyrus (right BA 22) X=54, Y=-57, Z=17
Table 4: Localization of FN current density activation (estimated voxel activity) maxima (hits 1-3) with
sLORETA grand averages of our six conditions. Values are displayed for time frame 9 (220-240
milliseconds after the presentation of the UG offer).
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6.3.2.    sLORETA within-subject comparisons  
SnPM was performed to investigate activation differences  between fair,  midfair and
unfair  offers  in  both  SOCIAL DISTANCE  conditions.  Additionally,  we  contrasted
identical types of offers between the conditions anonymity and information (e. g. unfair-
anonymity vs. unfair-information).
None of the comparisons accomplished yielded significant results in the time frames of
interest (especially time frame 9: 220-240 milliseconds after the presentation of the UG
offer).
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7 Discussion
This  diploma thesis  aimed to  investigate  whether  the  perception of  (un)fairness,  as
experienced  by  responders  being  confronted  with  different  types  of  UG  offers,  is
reflected in the amplitude of the feedback negativity (FN). Moreover, we tried to assess
the impact of social distance (manipulated via information provided to the responders
about their presumed counterparts) on behavioral and neural responses of our subjects.
The principal findings of the present research and attempts to link them with relevant
literature are presented in the following.
The absolute frequencies of acceptances for the different types of offers and associated
reaction times (RTs) found in this study were essentially in line with previous research
operating with similar designs (see for example Sanfey et al., 2003; Rilling et al., 2004;
Polezzi et al., 2008). Responders in our Ultimatum Game accepted almost every offer
with a proposed split of 5-5, around two thirds of the 7-3 offers and only few 9-1 offers
(10.04 % for  anonymity and 6.52 % for  information).  Subjects apparently tended to
reject offers they judged as unfair, and to accept fair ones. Decisions about fair offers
were executed more quickly than about midfair and unfair ones.  Unfair offers  were
associated with shorter RTs than midfair offers. Polezzi et al. (2008) reported a similar
pattern of response timing in their Ultimatum Game study.
No  significant  differences  in  acceptances  and  RTs  comparing  numerically  identical
offers between the two conditions  anonymity and  information could be observed. We
therefore conclude  that  the manipulation of  social  distance,  as  accomplished in  this
work,  had  no  (statistically  relevant)  effects  on  a  behavioral  level,  although  some
findings slightly point in this direction (see for example the acceptances for unfair offers
in the two social distance conditions). In fact, the analysis of responders' expectations
seems to support this view: Choice behavior was not differentially influenced by the
previous presentation of an identifiable or a non-identifiable counterpart. The fact that
participants were explicitly instructed to play with real human partners throughout the
experiment (although half of them were presented anonymously) may contribute to the
lack of differences  between  anonymity and  information conditions in  the  behavioral
data.
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As Yeung et al. (2005), as well as Donkers et al. (2005), we tried to address the question
raised by Nieuwenhuis and colleagues (2004a) whether FNs could also be observed
when  participants'  assignment  is  to  solely look  at  stimuli  informing  them  about
monetary rewards or punishments.  As mentioned above, FNs were reported in tasks
where no action or response was required from the participants (Yeung et al.,  2005;
Donkers et al., 2005).
In fact, an ERP component identified as the FN was observed following the presentation
of UG offers in our study. Mean amplitude analysis did not yield significant results,
likely because of a contamination of the FN with the P3 (the slow-wave positivity upon
which the FN is typically superimposed, see Yeung and Sanfey, 2004; cited after Yeung
et al.,  2005). Peak-to-peak  amplitudes of the FN were affected by the type of offer,
being smaller in size for fair as compared to midfair and unfair offers. In this sense, the
results of Polezzi et al. (2008), who found that a distinction between fair and other kinds
of offers was reflected in the FN amplitude, could be replicated. More precisely, we
additionally observed a significant difference between fair and midfair offers,  which
was not reported by Polezzi and colleagues (2008).
The scalp distribution of the FN found in this study largely corresponds to previously
reported  data  (e.  g.  Gehring  and  Willoughby,  2002;  Hajcak  et  al.,  2006),  while  its
morphology is strongly reminiscent of that presented by Polezzi et al. (2008).
In the context of the present work, the FN amplitude mirrors a rapid distinction between
fair and midfair, as well as fair and unfair offers, with smaller amplitudes for fair offers.
This is consistent with previous findings of large FNs being associated with unfavorable
outcomes, e. g. losses in gambling tasks (Gehring and Willoughby, 2002; Hajcak et al.,
2006) or negative performance feedback in a time estimation task (Miltner et al., 1997).
Our results can be comprehensively integrated into the reinforcement-learning theory of
the ERN (RL-ERN theory), as formulated by Holroyd and Coles (2002). The authors
argued that the FN is elicited whenever ongoing events are evaluated as 'worse than
expected'. Assuming that responders in the Ultimatum Game count on a fair share (as
reported by Burnham, 2003; Chang and Sanfey,  2009) and that  deviations from the
50-50 split equal a violation of their expectations (which is clearly indicated by our
participants' choice behavior regarding the expectations-question), the RL-ERN theory
may also account for the interpretation of our findings. The results are in line with two
basic predictions formulated by Nieuwenhuis et al. (2004a): The FN found in our study
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actually reflected an evaluation of ongoing events along an abstract good-bad dimension
as its amplitude was smaller for fair compared to midfair and unfair offers. Additionally,
we observed that the FN amplitude was larger for unfair as compared to midfair offers.
Though this  difference did not reach statistical  significance,  it  may still  support  the
second prediction of Nieuwenhuis et al. (2004a) that the amplitude of the FN depends
on  the  relation  between  actual  versus  expected  outcome  or  –  in  other  words  –  is
proportional  to the size of the prediction error.  We argue that  the more pronounced
difference  in  the  FN  amplitude  between  fair  and  unfair  offers  (compared  to  the
difference  between  fair  and  midfair  offers)  reflects  the  proportional  growth  of  the
reward prediction error. Our data show that an FN was elicited by different types of UG
offers – outcomes  that were not contingent on any preceding choice or action by our
subjects. This encourages the hypothesis that the FN rather reflects an evaluation of the
valence of experienced outcomes than a process of learning about actions that led to
those outcomes. The FN in the context of the present study may therefore mirror the
violation of  general  expectations and fairness  considerations  of  our  subjects.  In  this
sense  we  agree  with  the  proposal  of  Yeung  et  al.  (2005)  to  extend  the  RL-ERN
framework and  include  learning that  is  not  specifically related  to  recently executed
actions.
We  sought  to  generate  (or  additionally  enforce)  expectations  in  our  subjects  by
providing information about their presumed counterparts in the Ultimatum Game. This
manipulation  was  accomplished  to  reduce  the  degree  of  social  distance  among  the
players, which has been shown to have strong influence on economic game behavior
(Bohnet and Frey, 1999; Burnham, 2003; Charness and Gneezy, 2008). Differences in
FN amplitudes were only apparent in our  information condition, in which responders
were confronted with identifiable counterparts.  This finding supports the notion that
social  factors  play  a  crucial  role  in  economic  decision-making  and  may  also  be
explained with the motivational significance of ongoing events (see Yeung et al., 2005).
We hypothesize that playing with identifiable proposers (and not faceless, anonymous
counterparts) enhances subjective involvement in the task, as experienced by responders
in our Ultimatum Game. It seems that outcomes gain in importance when the degree of
social distance between the protagonists in a social exchange situation is reduced.
The reason why the manipulation of social distance influenced brain, but not behavioral
responses of our subjects appears to be still unclear. A fast initial distinction between
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fair and midfair respectively unfair offers was reflected in the amplitude of the FN.
Nevertheless it seems that the final decision whether to accept or reject an UG offer is
guided by various factores and not only the violation of expectations formed via social
information.
The ACC has consistently been reported to be the most likely neural generator of the FN
(see  for  example  Gehring and  Willoughby,  2002;  Holroyd  and  Coles,  2002),  larger
amplitudes being associated with higher ACC activity. Higher FN amplitudes for unfair
and midfair offers found in the study at hand are in this sense consistent with results
reported  by Sanfey et  al.  (2003)  showing enhanced  ACC activity for  unfair  offers.
Activation maxima with sLORETA grand averages for our six conditions were found in
temporal and parietal regions (especially Brodmann area 22). Similarly, Polezzi et al.
(2008) found the superior temporal gyrus (BA 22) more activated for midfair compared
to fair offers. An fMRI study by Rilling et al. (2004) employing the Ultimatum Game
reported higher activations in this area when subjects were interacting with presumed
human partners compared to computer partners. Like in the studies of Rilling et  al.
(2004) and Polezzi et al. (2008), activations in the superior temporal gyrus found in the
present work could be interpreted in terms of mentalizing (attempts of the responder to
understand the proposer's strategy). Though the subjects in our design played 288 one-
shot Ultimatum Game rounds, activity in the superior temporal gyrus may still reflect
responders' inferences about their partners' intentions. However, as SnPM did not yield
any significant differences in activation patterns comparing the different conditions, the
results have to be interpreted with reservation.
In summary, the present results show that the perception of different types of Ultimatum
Game offers generates an FN, being less pronounced for fair compared to midfair and
unfair offers. Social distance crucially influenced brain responses to the three offers, as
differences  in  the  FN amplitude  were  only apparent  when social  information  about
responders' counterparts was revealed. We propose that the FN in the context of this
study reflects the violation of general expectations and fairness considerations and that
its amplitude depends on the size of the prediction error.
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Appendix
A Instruction in German
Die Spielregeln
Im Ultimatumspiel  erhalten zwei Personen einen bestimmten Geldbetrag,  für
dessen Aufteilung eine der beiden (Proposer) der anderen (Responder) einen
Vorschlag  macht.  Wird  das  Angebot  angenommen,  wird  der  Betrag
entsprechend aufgeteilt. Wird es jedoch abgelehnt, gehen beide leer aus.
Im Vorfeld der Untersuchung wurden die Angebote von knapp 300 Personen
(50% weiblich, 50% männlich) eingeholt,  die für einen Gesamtbetrag von 10
Euro einen von drei möglichen Verteilungsvorschlägen wählen konnten: 5/5, 7/3
oder 9/1.
5/5 bedeutet,  dass der Proposer für sich fünf  Euro beansprucht und dir  fünf
Euro anbietet. Bei 7/3 sind drei Euro für dich vorgesehen und sieben für deinen
Spielpartner und analog erhältst du bei 9/1 einen Euro und der Anbieter neun.
Du  wirst  die  Rolle  des  Responders  übernehmen  und  im  Verlauf  des
Experiments  mit  diesen  Angeboten  konfrontiert  werden.  Die  Hälfte  deiner
Mitspieler wird dir vor der Präsentation des Angebots kurz mit Foto, Namen und
Alter vorgestellt; die andere Hälfte ist anonymisiert und wird nur mit „Proposer“
bezeichnet.  Deine  Aufgabe  besteht  im  Wesentlichen  darin,  nach  eigenem
Ermessen Angebote deiner Spielpartner anzunehmen oder abzulehnen. Nach
der  Vorstellung  der  Anbieter  erscheinen  am  Bildschirm  zwei  untereinander
angeordnete Kästchen, die den Verteilungsvorschlag enthalten, wobei die Ziffer
im unteren Kästchen dem für dich vorgesehenen Betrag entspricht. 
Nach  jedem  Angebot  erscheinen  am  unteren  Teil  des  Bildschirmes  zwei
weitere,  diesmal  nebeneinander  platzierte  Kästchen  mit  den
Antwortmöglichkeiten  „annehmen“  oder  „ablehnen“.  In  welchem  der  beiden
Kästchen  die  jeweilige  Antwortmöglichkeit  steht,  variiert  während  des
Experiments.  Solltest  du  jene  Antwortmöglichkeit  wählen,  die  rechts  am
Bildschirm steht, drücke bitte die Taste „2“. Für die Antwortmöglichkeit, die links
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am Bildschirm steht, drücke die Taste .„1“. 
Nach deiner  Entscheidung wirst  du befragt,  inwieweit  deine Erwartungen im
Bezug auf das jeweilige Angebotsverhalten erfüllt wurden. Es stehen folgende
Antwortalternativen zur Auswahl: „unterboten“, kann ausgewählt werden mit der
Taste  „1“;  „erfüllt“,  mit  Taste  „2“  kodiert  und  „übertroffen“.  Wurden  deine
Erwartungen übertroffen, drücke bitte die „3“.
Bezahlung
Die Summe des  Gewinnes der  Anbieter  wird  über  alle  Versuchspersonen  errechnet,
wobei nur jene 20 Anbieter Geld gewinnen können, die den höchsten Gewinn erzielten.
Die Ausbezahlung erfolgt nach einem bestimmten Verteilungsschlüssel. Für dich gilt:
Die Höhe deiner finanziellen Entschädigung wird durch dein Spielverhalten bestimmt
und  reicht  von  5  bis  maximal  10  Euro.  Die  im  Verlauf  des  Spiels  erzielten
„Spielgewinne“ werden über einen zuvor definierten Multiplikator in den tatsächlich
ausbezahlten Gewinn umgerechnet.
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B sLORETA grand averages
In the following sLORETA images of the grand averages at FN latency (time frame 9:
220-240 milliseconds  after  the  onset  of  the  UG offer)  for  our  six  conditions  (fair-
anonymity, midfair-anonymity, unfair-anonymity, fair-information, midfair-information
and  unfair-information) are presented.  Standardized current  density (estimated voxel
activity)  maxima,  MNI-coordinates  and  anatomical  structures  are  shown.  Estimated
cortical  activation  is  displayed  from  three  perspectives  (axial,  sagittal,  and  coronal
view), using a scale exponent of 5.75. Activation maxima are coded in yellow.
Fair-anonymity
Midfair-anonymity
65
Unfair-anonymity
Fair-information
Midfair-information
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Unfair-information
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C Abstract in German
Die so genannte Feedback Negativity (FN) ist eine Komponente des ereigniskorrelierten
Potentials (EKP), die nach Fehlern, negativem Leistungsfeedback und Geldverlusten in
Glücksspielen  generiert  wird.  Die  kürzlich  vorgeschlagene  Reinforcement-Learning
Theorie  der  FN  nimmt  an,  die  Einschätzung  von  Ereignissen  als  „schlechter  als
erwartet“ werde in der FN reflektiert.
Die  vorliegende  Studie  untersucht  die  Rolle  besagter  Komponente  im  Kontext  des
Ultimatumspiels. In diesem spieltheoretischen Paradigma erhalten zwei Personen einen
bestimmten  Geldbetrag  (hier  10  Euro),  wobei  die  erste  (Proposer)  der  zweiten
(Responder)  einen  Verteilungsvorschlag  unterbreitet,  den  letztgenannte  entweder
annehmen oder ablehnen kann. Wir gingen der Frage nach, ob die Wahrnehmung von
unterschiedlich  fairen  Angeboten  sich  in  der  Amplitude  der  FN  widerspiegelt.
Außerdem versuchten wir den Einfluss sozialer Distanz (manipuliert über das Ausmaß
an  Information,  dass  unseren  Versuchspersonen  über  ihre  Mitspieler  zukam)  auf
Verhaltens- und neuronaler Ebene zu bestimmen.
Elektroenzephalogramme (EEGs) wurden aufgezeichnet während unsere Probanden in
der Rolle des Responders mit fairen (ein Verteilungsvorschlag von 5-5), midfairen (7-3)
und  unfairen  (9-1)  Angeboten  konfrontiert  waren.  Wir  versuchten,  Erwartungen  in
unseren  Versuchspersonen  zu  wecken  über  soziale  Information,  die  sie  über  ihre
mutmaßlichen  Mitspieler  erhielten.  Diese  Manipulation  wurde  durchgeführt  um das
Ausmaß  an  sozialer  Distanz  zwischen  den  Spielern  zu  reduzieren,  was  erwiesener
Maßen erheblichen Einfluss auf ökonomisches Spielverhalten hat.
Wir  konnten  beobachten,  dass  die  Wahrnehmung  unterschiedlicher  Ultimatumspiel-
Angebote eine FN generierte,  wobei faire Angebote mit  den niedrigsten Amplituden
assoziiert waren. Der Grad an sozialer Distanz hat die neuronalen Antworten wesentlich
beeinflusst:  Unterschiede  in  der  Amplitude  der  FN konnten nur  festgestellt  werden,
wenn zuvor Informationen über den Mitspieler präsentiert wurden.
Wir  schlagen  vor,  dass  die  FN  in  dieser  Studie  die  Verletzung  von  allgemeinen
Erwartungen  und  Fairness-Überlegungen,  die  durch  soziale  Information  aktiviert
werden,  darstellt.  In  diesem Sinne hängt  die  Amplitude  der  FN von der  Größe des
Vorhersagefehlers  ab  und  wächst  mit  steigender  Abweichung  vom  fairen  50-50
Verteilungsvorschlag.
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